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Space, scale and Just War: meeting the
challenge of humanitarian intervention and
trans-national terrorism
JOHN WILLIAMS
Abstract. This article contributes to current debates about Just War by analysing an
insufficiently recognised problem with the way Just War theorists have responded to the two
principal challenges surrounding the ethics of violence in international relations since the end
of the Cold War – humanitarian intervention and the ‘global war on terror’. The problem
focuses on strongly embedded assumptions that exist in contemporary Just War debates about
the nature and meaning of territory. The article argues that Just War needs to engage more
systematically with challenges to dominant ‘Westphalian’ framings of territory, space and scale
in order to contribute more effectively to important ethical debates about the use of violence
in international relations.
Introduction
This article contributes to current debates about Just War by analysing an insuffi-
ciently recognised problem with the way Just War theorists have responded to the
two principal challenges surrounding the ethics of violence in international relations
since the end of the Cold War – humanitarian intervention and the ‘global war on
terror’. The problem focuses on strongly embedded assumptions that exist in
contemporary Just War debates about the nature and meaning of territory. Most
importantly for this article, authority is so strongly linked to the territorially
bordered and defined state that non-state based political forms, projects and activities
are marginalised in analysis and ethically disadvantaged. Much contemporary work
pushes this link between legitimate authority, a key jus ad bellum principle, and the
state, arguing, as we shall see, that it is only territorially defined sites of political
authority that have the potential to make an ethically positive contribution to
meeting the challenges of humanitarian intervention and the ‘war on terror’.1
1 Any article wishing to discuss ‘Just War theory’ or even ‘Just War’ needs to recognise the enormous
historical diversity and complexity of debate. It is not possible to speak of a single ‘Just War theory’
or to take any single individual as the exemplar of Just War thinking, even within a particular
historical period. One of Just War’s great virtues is the plurality of approaches and the scope of
resources that it offers for thinking about the problems of ethics and violence. Nevertheless, any
article that does not see itself as an exercise in the history of political thought, which is certainly not
the intention of this article, must make some choices about simplifications and omissions if it is to
be a practicable exercise. Amongst the omissions here is a decision not to discuss classical, medieval
or early modern variants on Just War theory, not because they do not contribute to the problem I
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Therefore, whilst this is not an article about the theory of state in contemporary,
and particularly liberal, Just War theory, it does want to argue that a key component
of statehood – territoriality of a particular form – is being used largely without
sufficient consideration as to whether or not this is the most effective way of thinking
about space and territory as we seek to utilise Just War as an effective framework for
ethical consideration of humanitarian intervention and the ‘war on terror’. The
conceptualisation of territory in current liberal Just War debates makes an ethical
claim out of an empirical point about the non- or differently-territorial concepts of
political space that are made by some non-state groups involved in these contem-
porary ‘just wars’. Because such groups do not ascribe to a statist, or even a liberal
statist, agenda in how they understand the location of political authority, ideas
of just cause and questions of proportionality, the possibility of their position being
compatible with the requirements of a just war is almost automatically rejected.
Whilst we may ethically condemn fundamentalist ‘jihadist’ versions, or perver-
sions, of Islam, that kind of project – non-territorial, at least in the conventional
sense, and separate from state-based conceptions of citizenship as the ethically ideal
relationship between individual and political authority – cannot gain a foothold
within Just War’s response to changing patterns of violence. This, the article argues,
is because contemporary liberal Just War theory is adopting a concept of territory
that assumes that only conventionally bordered states can be just political com-
munities and that only political projects that aim at the creation of such states are
ethically defensible. Non-territorial is in danger of coming to mean unethical.
An inadequately critical engagement with the relationship between space,
territory, borders and authority are damaging Just War’s ability to think ethically
and effectively about contemporary forms of political violence. Just War thinking can
meet these challenges, if we adopt a more flexible approach to these issues. In
particular, as writers such as Nicholas Rengger have argued, we need to see Just War
more as a tradition of ethical thinking about organised violence that establishes the
central questions we need to ask and the issues we ought to address, rather than rules
for how to act.2 The close connection between contemporary Just War theory and
international law downplays this more flexible and open-minded approach and thus
this article is also in part a critique of the style and mode of theory that dominates
the current literature, as we shall see below.3
The article proceeds in four stages. The first outlines the ‘triumph’ of Just War
theory in shaping ethico-political responses to humanitarian intervention and the
‘war on terror’, generating some insightful and highly sophisticated thinking. These
two issues are portrayed as ‘challenges’ to Just War, but not in the sense that the
am concerned with, but more for reasons of space and a desire to see how current work in fields
like political geography can be helpfully applied. The focus of this article is, as should become
obvious, discussions about Just War in the last ten years or so, and within those there is a
concentration on what seems to me to be the most important trend within those discussions – a
liberal, internationalist focus. Thus when using terms like ‘Just War’ or ‘Just War theory’ the article
intends these labels to be read as applying to this work. Occasional clarifying reminders are placed
in the text, and I have also tried to indicate where I am departing from this usage.
2 Nicholas Rengger, ‘On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century’, International Affairs,
78:2 (2002).
3 Influential in reading Just War into international law, and stressing a normative agenda that sees
rules, including formal laws, as important to developing Just War theory is Michael Walzer, Just
and Unjust Wars: a Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, 3rd edn (New York: Basic Books,
2000).
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tradition is ill-equipped to deal with them, or has had to ‘bolt on’ ideas from other
fields of ethico-political enquiry. Instead, the idea of a challenge is here meant to
show how the wider-resources of the tradition can be effectively deployed to address
the distinctive features of these forms of violence. Indeed, for some, an activity like
humanitarian intervention can easily fall within the rubric of Just War.4
The second section looks initially at Martin Shaw’s critiques of Just War as an
example of someone who has tried to develop a global approach to thinking ethically
about violence, via human rights. This serves as an example of how non-statist
thinking in this area is available and the section also outlines how ideas of territory,
scale and space are influencing other approaches to changing patterns of violence in
international relations in fields such as security. This shows how our ethical enquiry is
in danger of missing out on a move being made to good effect elsewhere in the subject.
Additionally, the article considers briefly ways in which political geography has
looked at Just War in the ‘war on terror’, identifying key shortcomings in this work
as a way to enhancing ethical analysis. The relationship between space, scale and
ethics is the principal subject of this third section, using political geography’s critique
of ‘Westphalian’ territorial thinking to pick out some of the key challenges that Just
War theory faces in addressing humanitarian intervention and the ‘war on terror’,
especially as these are brought together. We shall return here to more detailed
consideration of the relationship between territory and authority, and the strongly
liberal analytical and normative framework that is deployed in those elements of
contemporary Just War work that are the target of this critique. This will hopefully
support the claim about the exclusion, almost by definition, of alternative territorial
conceptions from inclusion within the remit of Just War theory.
Finally, the article aims to establish an agenda of issues where a less territorially
rigid approach within Just War theory can pay dividends in enabling more effective
ethical analysis of and engagement with key issues in the contemporary ethics of
violence. It does not offer a case-study based approach, for reasons of space, but
instead suggests how some of the key questions Just War asks can be asked in a
somewhat different manner to that which tends to characterise the framing within
contemporary liberal Just War writings. A more open-minded, or at least considered,
approach to ethics and territory opens the possibility of both a more effective
response to the challenges of intervention and terrorism, and a more dynamic
engagement with alternative ethico-political conceptions of the role of territory in
international relations. These conceptions are often highlighted as of growing
relevance and significance in other areas of the discipline and practice of international
politics. The flexibility and inclusiveness of the wider Just War tradition can
accommodate these developments to good effect.
Just War, humanitarian intervention and the war on terror – a tale of triumph?
Just War theory successfully shapes, indeed dominates, political-ethical debates
about the use of force in international relations. Success may bring certain dangers,
4 I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for pointing out the potential confusion in the use
of ‘challenge’ here.
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but sharing Walzer’s general satisfaction with the way Just War ideas and categories
are unavoidable in thinking about and assessing the use of violence is not difficult.5
Moral scepticism of the sort critically portrayed by Frost or Dower retains little
academic credibility in the face of Just War’s ubiquity and utility, not to mention its
intellectual sophistication.6 For those committed to the centrality of ethics in the
study and practice of international relations, Just War’s ‘triumph’ is heartening.
Two particular instances highlight how Just War shapes and directs debate, even
as international relations moves away from classic inter-state war. Since the 1990s,
debate over humanitarian intervention has continually referred to the ideas of Just
War.7 An amended Just War framework is central to both landmark policy
statements8 and leading academic analysis of and, in particular, advocacy for, a
limited right to humanitarian intervention.9 Including a right, or possibly even a
duty, to defend the victims of grave humanitarian crises within ‘just cause’ has been
one move. Debating the nature of legitimate authority in these circumstances to
minimise the opportunity for abuse by the powerful is another. Just cause and
legitimate authority are issues the article will return to, as they are important to its
case, but the overall agenda extends much further. Wrestling with the challenge of
intent in multi-faceted situations where complex actors may intend multiple out-
comes and be motivated by a variety of desires is a further issue in this area. Finally,
looking at how Just War’s rules of combat may have to change in the absence of a
‘battlefield’, in the conventional sense, is another important element of this process.
The second challenge that, on the triumphalist account, Just War has risen to has
been the ‘war on terror’. Despite political rhetoric about the absence of rules,10 or the
paradigm-shattering nature of transnational, mass-casualty terrorism, Just War ideas
and categories remain central to public political debate. Again, the reaction has been
to augment, refine, adjust and revisit the ideas of just cause, legitimate authority,
right intention, proportionality, non-combatant immunity and so on. Ideas such as
preventive war11 and the notion of ‘illegal combatants’ as a new, ethically laden,
category into which transnational terrorists fall,12 have sparked vibrant political and
5 Michael Walzer, ‘The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success)’, Social Research,
69:4 (2002).
6 Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
Nigel Dower, World Ethics: The New Agenda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998).
7 For example, Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention
and the 2005 World Summit’, Ethics & International Affairs, 20:2 (2006).
8 Tony Blair, ‘The Doctrine of International Community’, speech to the Economic Club of Chicago
22 April 1999 available at 〈http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp〉; International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect (Ottowa: ICISS, 2001).
9 For example, Fernando Te´son, Humanitarian Intervention, 3rd edn (Dobbs Ferry, NY:
Transnational, 2005); Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
10 Andrew Hurrell, ‘ ‘‘There Are No Rules’’ (George W. Bush): International Order After September
11th’, International Relations, 16:2 (2002).
11 For example, National Security Council, National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(2002) available at 〈http://www.whitehous.gov/nsc/ns.pdf〉; Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane,
‘The Preventive Use of Force: a Cosmopolitan Institutional Perspective’, Ethics & International
Affairs, 18:1 (2004); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror: the Burden of American Power
in a Violent World (New York: Basic Books, 2004); Whitley Kaufman, ‘What’s Wrong With
Preventive War? The Moral and Legal Basis for the Preventive Use of Force’, Ethics & International
Affairs, 19:3 (2005).
12 For example, George H. Aldrich, ‘The Taliban, al Qaeda and the Determination of Illegal
Combatants’, American Journal of International Law, 96:4 (2002).
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academic debates. Some revisit old territory, cast with fresh light from the burning
towers of the World Trade Centre, such as the permissibility of torturing suspects for
information about planned attacks.13 Others are substantively new, such as Te´son’s
efforts to connect humanitarian intervention to regime change and the rights of
liberal states, especially the US, to replace illiberal tyranny in the name of both the
victims of such tyrants and the wider call of security for the ethically superior liberal
parts of the world.14
Indeed, Te´son’s argument symbolises the triumph of Just War theory, by bringing
together into one revised doctrine the two post-Cold War challenges to Just War
theory’s most familiar terrain of inter-state war. This is not without problems or
critics, but it shows that Just War theory remains an effective ethical framework for
addressing pressing contemporary issues of violence in international relations.15 This
move may extend further, as Te´son’s argument shares features of Feinstein and
Slaughter’s analysis connecting those advocating limited rights of humanitarian
intervention with the need to combat transnational terrorism and the proliferation of
WMD.16 Feinstein and Slaughter also deploy notions of just cause, proportionality,
legitimate authority, right intention and last resort from Just War’s lexicon.17
Buchanan and Keohane’s influential defence of preventive war also utilises Just
War criteria and extends this line of ethical reasoning. They assume an unproblem-
atic conflation of, firstly, cosmopolitan ethical concern with human rights and,
secondly, a straightforward statement that cosmopolitanism of this stripe is ‘central
to the just war tradition and the current international legal order’s allowing human
rights to limit state sovereignty.’18 Historians of the Just War tradition would find
such claims surprising, as would those who see rules on violence, such as those of the
Just War, as principally being about protecting the rights of states.19 It also typifies
concern about an overly close relationship between Just War theory and current legal
doctrine. That Buchanan and Keohane construct a defence of preventive war in the
face of non-imminent threats of mass-casualty terrorist attack further emphasises the
highly distinctive blending of human rights, just war, humanitarian intervention and
anti-terrorist actions in recent debate.20
The intellectual sophistication of this debate is impressive and intimidating. The
weight of ages bears down and heavyweights of the philosophical, theological and
political theoretical traditions are cited to grant vicarious authority to contemporary
debate. Some see this venerability as providing rich resources for addressing
13 For example, Alan M. Dershowitz, ‘The Case for Torture Warrants’, 2002, available at:
〈http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/dershowitz/Articles/torturewarrants.html〉; Charles
Krauthammer, ‘The Truth About Torture: It’s Time to be Honest About Doing Terrible Things’,
The Weekly Standard, 11:12 (2005).
14 Fernando Te´son, ‘Ending Tyranny in Iraq’, Ethics & International Affairs, 19:2 (2005).
15 Terry Nardin, ‘Humanitarian Imperialism’, ibid.
16 Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Prevent’, Foreign Affairs, 83:1 (2004).
17 Feinstein and Slaughter, ‘Duty to Prevent’, pp. 148–9.
18 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘Preventive Use of Force’, pp. 1, 4.
19 For example, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics (London:
Macmillan, 1977); Robert H. Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); James Mayall, World Politics: Progress and Its Limits
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). However, we perhaps ought to allow Buchanan and Keohane the
same licence as I request in note 1 – when we use the term ‘Just War theory’ we aren’t necessarily
claiming to represent the entire canon of work over the last 1,500 years or more.
20 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘Preventive Use of Force’, pp. 5–10. See also Steven Lee, ‘A Moral
Critique of the Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal’, Ethics & International Affairs, 18:1 (2005).
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contemporary issues. James Turner Johnson is the pre-eminent example of this
approach, his ‘Morality and Contemporary Warfare’ draws extensively on the
tradition to encompass contemporary challenges, principally of humanitarian
intervention, but also applicable to the ‘war on terror’.21
Others develop Walzer’s more ‘applied’ approach, although he also lays some
claim to the theological and philosophical strands of the tradition. Just War’s key
virtue is the ability to illuminate historical ‘illustrations’ and to learn from, adapt to
and engage with historical trends in the material capabilities of violence. Just War
is a living tradition, benefiting from not being inextricably tied to foundational
theological or philosophical claims about the nature of human beings, law or the
divinely ordained order of things. Secularised, goes the argument, Just War is
stronger, although we should remember that even shallow excavation will ‘. . . find a
theological claim lurking underneath.’22
Secularisation stems partly from inserting Just War thinking into the
‘Westphalian’ world, as Elshtain terms it, and the logics of an international society,
or societies, that consequently arise.23 This is an important move for the form of Just
War theory that this article focuses upon, and is thus a line that receives attention
later in the article. Pre-Westphalian and more theological strands endure into the
modern period, though, and debates about issues such as legitimate authority
continue to wrestle over the mantle of, for example, Saint Augustine.24 Also
important to secularisation is Just War’s role in shaping international law and the
development of the international legal tradition, particularly its positivist incarna-
tions where rational interest underpins jurisprudential reasoning and the nature
and purpose of public law.25 The idea of legitimacy as a politico-legal construct,
associated most closely with Thomas Franck; the decline of strict legal positivism;
and the reconnection of legal manifestations of Just War thinking with wider
normative theoretical debate, demonstrate the complexity, sophistication, rigour and
sheer volume of material upon which contemporary Just War theorists can draw.26
A final example of the sophistication of the debate is the development of jus post
bellum alongside traditional jus ad bellum and jus in bello categories. Johnson is
amongst those developing this category, although he does not use the label,
reiterating that those working principally within the classical resources of the
tradition remain innovative and responsive to contemporary challenges.27 Evans,
Rigby and Hayden develop explicit discussions of the jus post bellum.28 Earlier
21 James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare (Cambridge, MA: Yale University
Press, 1999).
22 Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘International Justice as Equal Regard and the Use of Force’, Ethics &
International Affairs, 17:2 (2003), p. 69.
23 Elshtain, ‘International Justice’, p. 69. On international society, see Bull, Anarchical Society and on
international societies, see Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and
Order in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
24 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the need to emphasise this point.
25 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 58–63.
26 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1990).
27 Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, pp. 191–218.
28 Mark Evans, ‘Moral Theory and the Idea of a Just War’, in Mark Evans (ed.), Just War Theory: A
Reappraisal (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 19–20; Andrew Rigby, ‘Forgiveness
and Reconciliation in Jus Post Bellum’, in Evans (ed.), Just War Theory; Patrick Hayden, ‘Security
Beyond the State: Cosmopolitanism, Peace and the Role of Just War Theory’, in Evans (ed.), Just
War Theory.
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discussions of humanitarian intervention implicitly require this category because they
emphasise long-term commitment to prevent humanitarian disasters necessitating
intervention recurring.29
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq bring home jus post bellum’s necessity in the
‘war on terror’, demonstrating the enormous difficulty of establishing such justice,
especially when ‘justice’ is deeply indebted to liberalism, yet local circumstances are
not hospitable to that doctrine. In some ways, this, too, recaptures the richness of the
Just War tradition. Restoration of the status quo ante bellum as being about all that
needed to be said on this subject, and thus covered by the right intention principle of
the jus ad bellum, stands in contrast to the idea of punishment that was prominent in
the classic, Christian texts on Just War.30 It is notable, though, that some analysts see
the war on terror as akin to punishment, which the medieval tradition included as an
element of just cause.31 Contemporary jus post bellum ideas recapture some of that
spirit, for example in seeing as essential arraigning those responsible for gross human
rights abuses before appropriate courts. I will not discuss the restorative versus
retributive justice debate in any detail, but, again, this sophisticated discussion
highlights how serious consideration of the nature and content of jus post bellum is
underway.32 We also find here a hint of the statist territorialisation embedded even in
these innovative arguments, via debates over whether the process should take place
within the state concerned and under the auspices of its own authoritative institu-
tions, or whether international tribunals or courts, constituted through treaty or UN
resolution, offer the best way forward. Either way, the right to authorise, frame and
conduct the pursuit of jus post bellum is state-based.
Particularly pertinent to this article is the way jus post bellum is linked to political
transformation in post conflict societies that embeds liberal democratic values,
concepts, institutions and practices. This applies whether we are dealing with the
aftermath of humanitarian intervention or action pursuant to the ‘war on terror’.
In its strongest statements jus post bellum is defined by the creation of liberal demo-
cratic states.33 However, having sketched Just War’s response to the challenges of
humanitarian intervention and the ‘war on terror’, largely successful in the eyes of
those canvassed above, it is time to look at critique, especially that laying foundations
for arguments I wish to make in response to the ‘triumph’ of Just War theory.
Challenging Just War theory
Most interesting of the challenges to these moves in Just War is the use of human
rights because of the way they promise a global, deterritorialised perspective able to
29 Wheeler, Saving Strangers; ICISS, Responsibility to Protect, pp. 39–46.
30 I am indebted to Anthony F. Lang, Jr. for this point. See also Gregory Reichberg, Henrik Syse and
Endre Begby (eds), The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Blackwell,
2006), pp. 60–199.
31 Paul Gilbert, New Terror, New Wars (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), pp. 100–1.
32 Gilbert, New Terror, pp. 103–51; Rigby, ‘Forgiveness and Reconciliation’; Andrew Schaap,
‘Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice’, in Anthony F. Lang, Jr. and John Williams
(eds), Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings Across the Lines (New York: Palgrave,
2005).
33 For example, Elshtain, ‘International Justice’; Elshtain, Just War Against Terror; Te´son, ‘Ending
Tyranny’.
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challenge ways in which we think about the political authority of the state and the
standards and measures against which we judge questions such as just cause and
proportionality. They ought, on the face of it, to be very helpful in pushing forwards
a critical agenda on the concept of territory in most contemporary liberal Just War
writing and the implications that flow from an overly static and ‘Westphalian’ view.
In particular, the emphasis on human rights has lead to debates over whether human
rights are compatible with, and even enhanced by, a commitment to Just War
principles and practices. Some have seen little difficulty with this,34 whilst others have
debated whether human rights are a useful analogy for Just War principles: for
example is the state’s right to self-defence analogous to that of individuals, or is it
instead the cumulative result of the individual rights of the state’s citizens?35
Not all are satisfied with these moves. Martin Shaw, for example, places human
rights centre-stage in his critique of ‘risk transfer war’, which characterises, he argues,
the ways leading Western military powers, most importantly the Unites States, have
pursued military operations in the last decade.36 This is the latest incarnation of
‘degenerate war’ – the process by which, throughout the twentieth century, war
increasingly focused on killing civilians and destroying societies.37 This process was
driven by the leading powers throughout this time, and cannot be dismissed as a
consequence of ‘degenerate’ regimes, such as Nazi Germany. Neither is it limited to
the phenomena of ‘new wars’,38 in which the collapse of legitimate political authority
helps bring about brutal internecine conflicts driven by some combination of
ideological, religious or nationalist prejudice, and economic enrichment. For Shaw,
the wars fought in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are from the same stable as those
in Democratic Republic of Congo, Chechnya or Liberia.
The idea of Just War faces a fundamental crisis in its ability to set rules, principles
and limits on this degeneracy and is becoming a threat to the ethical imperative of
protecting human rights, because what characterises this commonality is the abuse of
human rights. In the latter conflicts this is perhaps more obvious, because pillage,
rape, mutilation, massacre and torture are routinely deployed by those ostensibly
part of armed organisations. In the case of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, however,
degeneracy is less immediately apparent. Abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib, Camp
Breadbasket, CIA ‘black prisons’ and Guantanomo Bay receive widespread atten-
tion, but Shaw’s argument is different. His claim is that contemporary Western
warfare abuses human rights by transferring risk from Western combatants to the
non-combatants of the state where the conflict is taking place, even when the state
apparatus may not be the target of military action.
Although precision guided munitions enable Western militaries to avoid the most
blatant instances of degeneracy, such as the area bombing of cities, the pattern of
34 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘Preventive Use of Force’; Te´son, ‘Ending Tyranny’.
35 For example, Gilbert, New Terror, pp. 24–46; Jeff McMahan, ‘War as Self-Defense’, Ethics &
International Affairs, 18:1 (2004); David Rodin, ‘War and Self-Defense’, Ethics & International
Affairs, 18:1 (2004); Cheney C. Ryan, ‘Self-Defense and the Obligations to Kill and Die’, Ethics &
International Affairs, 18:1 (2004).
36 Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2005).
37 Martin Shaw, War and Genocide: Organized Killing in Modern Society (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2003).
38 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1999).
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transferring risk to civilians has in fact accelerated. Whilst casualty figures may be
lower overall, the proportion of enemy non-combatants being killed or injured has
risen, and risen dramatically. In the war over Kosovo, famously, NATO forces
suffered no combat deaths. In the war to overthrow the Taliban, the only US combat
death was of a CIA agent caught up in a riot of prisoners of war. The prison was
subsequently levelled and the vast majority of the prisoners killed, despite their
non-combatant status in Just War terms.39
Shaw’s critique is powerful and thought-provoking. He challenges arguments that
precision guided munitions restore a degree of discrimination between combatant
and non-combatant that the industrialised warfare of the twentieth century had
seemingly destroyed, pointing to the balance of risk in the context of human rights.40
Shaw argues that rights of Western combatants are almost automatically placed
ahead of those of enemy non-combatants. Saving soldier’s lives at the cost of civilians
is a part of the degeneracy of warfare, and even if the scale of civilian losses may be
lower in terms of outright numbers they now make up a larger proportion of those
killed and injured, with Western combatants becoming less likely to be casualties.41
Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan may restore the vulnerability of Western
troops to an extent, but even here the number of civilians being killed dwarfs the
number of troops. Shaw thus argues that, from a human rights perspective, Just War
has failed to rein in warfare’s degenerate tendencies. Just War thinking has lost touch
with the human rights tradition that alone can ground an ethical framework for
thinking about the systematic and organised use of violence. We cannot, in an era of
global human rights, ethically privilege ‘our’ state and ‘our’ citizens in order to place
the lives of ‘our’ soldiers ahead of ‘their’ civilians. The globalised character of these
conflicts means the global standards the leading powers claim to be upholding must
be and are held against them by global media and civil society organisations. The
authority and accountability for war are no longer, therefore, state-based. Shaw’s
analysis of the failure of Just War theory to escape the ‘sorry comforter’ tag leads not
to pacifism, but to an appeal to a different scale – the global – and a deterritorialised
account of the ethics of war. This, therefore, looks very promising in our search for
a way to unpick some of the problems with contemporary Just War debates about
these conflicts.
Shaw’s critique plugs into a wider trend in thinking about war appealing to
different notions of the role, nature and meaning of territory associated with the
emergence of non-state based conceptions of space and scale.42 Globalisation is a part
of this with obvious relevance for current Just War debates about terrorism. The idea
of a ‘global war on terror’ and the ways leaders like Tony Blair located both
humanitarian intervention and anti-terrorism within a context of globalisation point
to these connections.43 The global scope of human rights claims underpinning
humanitarian intervention (and Shaw’s critique of Just War) and the transnational
characterisation of al Qaeda and other terrorist organisations can be seen in the same
39 Shaw, War and Genocide, pp. 126–7, 238–40; Gilbert, New Terror, p. 101.
40 For example, Elshtain, ‘International Justice’, p. 69, n. 6.
41 Shaw, War and Genocide, pp. 238–40; Shaw, New Western Way.
42 For example, John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 2003); Jan
Aart Scholte, Globalization: a Critical Introduction, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005).
43 John Williams with Tim Roach, ‘Security, Territorial Borders and British Iraq Policy: Buying a
Blair Way to Heaven?’, Geopolitics, 11:1 (2006).
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light. The notion of ‘new wars’ raises questions about the understanding of territory
that participants evoke alongside concern at their brutality. Sometimes, most notably
in former Yugoslavia, conflict is about statehood and a national homeland, but even
there, and more so in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, controlling
territory is not about seeking a homeland or commanding authority in the name of
a political programme, it is about economic activity – ‘banditstans’. Political fears
about ‘failed states’ have refocused from humanitarian catastrophe following the
disintegration of political authority, to ‘failed states’ as havens for transnational
terrorists, with Somalia in 1992 and now illustrating both points.
However, a lot of the contemporary Just War debate refers explicitly to
‘Westphalian’ states, especially in relation to key debates about cause, authority and
proportionality.44 When the nomenclature is absent, the understanding of territory
typically fits this ‘Westphalian’ pattern and the perspective of the global, where Shaw
wishes to lead us, is strongly resisted. Here, to quote Elshtain, ‘The presumption of
state sovereignty held that the state alone was the arbiter of what counted as justice,
law and freedom within its bounded territory.’45 Whilst, as we have seen, Just War
theorists like Elshtain advocate limits to permissible interpretations of justice, law
and freedom, that institutionalisation and operationalisation of these crucial values
revolves around the state remains almost unchallenged in the contemporary liberal
Just War literature this article surveys. So, for example, for Buchanan and Keohane
it is the United Nations, backed-up by a coalition of democratic states, which will
hold accountable states (and it is states alone) that carry out preventive military
operations.46 For Te´son, Just War will reform tyrannical states, making them
partners in protecting and promoting human rights understood, as Elshtain argues,
to require a territorialised political authority claiming sovereignty if they are to be
practically meaningful.47
However, this conception of territory is contestable and the idea of a stable
constellation of identity, values, authority, security and power defining the state since
Westphalia is a myth, although a widespread and deeply-rooted one. It is relatively
novel – potentially as recent an invention as the late 1940s.48 Political geographers,
particularly those pursuing critical geopolitics, have explored how understandings of
the nature and role of territory are connected to power political practices to show
that territory and territoriality are highly political and dynamic phenomena.49 The
relationship between territory, society and the state is complex and thus the
relationship between territory and the values of such societies, including notions of
justice and freedom, is far from straightforward.50 Our spatial ideas about scale,
territory and borders play significant roles in what we value and how we value it, and
thus in our ethical perspective on violence legitimised in the name of justice.
Bordering sovereignty with precise, razor-sharp lines on the map is one example of
44 For example, Gilbert, New Terror, pp. 103–4; Elshtain, ‘International Justice’, p. 65.
45 Elshtain, ‘International Justice’, p. 65.
46 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘Preventive Force’.
47 Te´son, ‘Ending Tyranny’; Elshtain, ‘International Justice’.
48 Peter Stirk, ‘The Origins of the Westphalian Myth’, unpublished ms.
49 For example, John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and
International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1995); Gearoid Ou Thuathail, Critical
Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (London: Routledge, 1996).
50 Jouni Hakli, ‘In the Territory of Knowledge: State-Centred Discourses and the Construction of
Society’, Progress in Human Geography, 25:3 (2001).
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how the meaning and significance of certain pieces of territory change. Border zones
as places where security and identity are threatened, where wars are most likely to
occur and where sovereign authority is most visible through the policing of entry and
exit from the state, indicates this geographical distinctiveness.51
Experiences, such as that of the EU, show how the location, significance and
character of borders can change, with the development of the Schengen agreement
pushing classic ‘sovereign’ functions of controlling ingress and egress away from
sovereign states like Belgium or Holland, which lack non-Schengen land borders, and
towards the EU’s periphery and the idea of ‘fortress Europe’ being in the hands of the
Slovaks, Poles, Slovenians, Greeks, Spaniards and others. This ‘de-naturalizes’
European states’ borders, reinforcing the need to think about activity like security,
immigration and belonging at multiple scales and in spaces distinct from the
‘Westphalian’ state.52 Abandoning the ‘state’ for the ‘global’ as we search for a
different spatial and scalar analysis on Just War therefore seems implausible. We
have to look for resources within Just War theory and its present statist formulation
to augment these critiques, and those coming from elsewhere in relevant areas of
international relations.
Security analysis within international relations has also changed scale, moving
away from the state and placing regions at the centre of a diversified security agenda
where war and military action play an important but not necessarily dominant part.53
Structural theories of state behaviour are also recognising the growing significance of
regions. Buzan’s reappraisal of the English school, systematising its theory, renews
the understanding of structure in English school theory and adds a regional
dimension to its scales of analysis.54 Similarly, his account of polarity reintroduces a
category of ‘great power’ to augment ‘superpower’ and ‘other’, emphasising the
significance of regions and the regional scope of states’ power projection capabilities
and political ambitions.55
This trend away from statist analyses, alongside Shaw’s global re-framing of the
ethics of war, highlights that responses to humanitarian intervention and trans-
national terrorism could connect to ideas of changing scale, differing conceptions of
political space and awareness of diverse understandings of territory. Contemporary
liberal Just War theory, though, is heading in the opposite direction. The state not
only retains its central position, but this is being reinforced, at some cost to Just
War’s ability to engage effectively with contemporary warfare.
From the political geography side of this picture, there has been some work on
Just War and political space. This very strongly emphasises the idea that Just War
51 For example, Peter Andreas, ‘Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First
Century’, International Security, 28:2 (2003); Hastings Donnan and Thomas Wilson, Borders:
Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State (Oxford: Berg, 1999); David Newman and Anssi Paasi,
‘Fences and Neighbours in the Post-Modern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography’,
Progress in Human Geography, 22:2 (1998); John Williams, Ethics and Territorial Borders: Drawing
Lines in the Shifting Sands (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006).
52 William Walters, ‘De-Naturalising the Border: The Politics of Schengenland’, Environment and
Planning D: Society and Space, 20:5 (2002).
53 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
54 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of
Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
55 Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).
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is only applicable to inter-state warfare and is an extension of the dominant,
‘Westphalian’ territorial conception.56 As such, it reinforces the need for critique and
highlights just how political ideas of territory are, and how important a role these
established notions play in thinking about war and violence. More generally, though,
this work sees little hope in Just War theory as a framework or resource for engaging
effectively with the challenges of humanitarian intervention and the war on terror.
This is because it sees Just War theory as a discursive manifestation of hegemonic
power in international relations, the ‘prime morality’ to go alongside the ‘prime
modernity’57 through which the United States has been able to establish and impose
wide-ranging political, economic, social and cultural expectations, norms and rules
that grant the US a privileged position and establish its authority to break the rules
that it sets for others. The contradictions between the ideas of moral equality between
states via sovereign equality, which this work stresses as the central element of Just
War, and US extra-territorial action, are finessed through a series of ethical claims
and moves that are testimony to the hegemonic power’s ability to manipulate, alter
and subjugate ethical claims, ideas and discourse to its own ends.58
This account of Just War is very thin, being heavily reliant on Walzer’s Just and
Unjust Wars as being the definitive statement of Just War theory and taking some
remarkable liberties with the tradition’s dynamic and conflictual historical develop-
ment.59 This is not the place to engage in detailed critique of the shortcomings of
these accounts, though. The main point to make is that, so far, political geographers
have seen Just War theory as simply an extension of the struggles for and attainment
of hegemony. They deny its ability, and, indeed, presumably the ability of any moral
and ethical analysis of political behaviour, to be more than an epiphenomenon of
power. This is perhaps symbolised by the quote to be found repeated time and again
and which seems, to these authors, to sum up Just War in their eyes: ‘A war called
unjust is a war misliked’.60 Just War is thus about presentation and public
relations – indeed it cannot be anything more – and therefore thinking about how
humanitarian intervention and the ‘war on terror’ present serious and ethically
significant challenges to our understanding of the nature and significance of territory
cannot be advanced by calling on the tradition of Just War. Indeed, on the logic of
56 Colin Flint, ‘Dynamic Metageographies of Terrorism: the Spatial Challenge of Religious Terrorism
and the ‘‘War on Terrorism’’ ’, in Colin Flint (ed.), The Geography of War and Peace: from Death
Camps to Diplomats (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 210–11.
57 Colin Flint and Ghazi-Walid Falah, ‘How the United States Justified Its War on Terrorism: Prime
Morality and the Construction of a ‘‘Just War’’ ’, Third World Quarterly, 25:8 (2004), especially
pp. 1387–9.
58 Flint, ‘Dynamic Metageographies’, pp. 210–11; Flint and Falah, ‘How the United States Justified Its
War on Terrorism’, pp. 1379–89; Ghazi-Walid Falah, Colin Flint and Virgine Mamadouh, ‘Just
War and Extraterritoriality: The Popular Geopolitics of the United States’ War on Iraq as Reflected
in the Newspapers of the Arab World’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 96:1
(2006), pp. 142–6.
59 For example, Falah, Flint and Mamadouh, ‘Just War and Extraterritoriality’, p. 144.
60 The quote is taken from Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 12. It is repeated in Flint, ‘Dynamic
Metageographies’, p. 210; Flint and Falah, ‘How the United States Justified Its War on Terrorism’,
p. 1395; Falah, Flint and Mamadouh, ‘Just War and Extraterritoriality’, p. 143, and Ghazi-Walid
Falah, ‘Peace, Deception and Justification for Territorial Claims: the Case of Israel’, in Flint (ed.),
Geography of War and Peace, p. 297. It is interesting that all these repetitions appear in either the
introductory or concluding summaries of the significance of Just War and the lessons for political
geography. It is also noteworthy that Walzer, in fact, uses it in paraphrase of Hobbes and, in the
same sentence, explains why he finds such a stance to be fundamentally flawed. None of the
citations acknowledge this.
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seeing ethical debate and discourse as manifestations of power, we have no resources
for engaging in such analysis. Clearly, this is a conclusion which this article cannot
accept. It is time, then, to move on and see where the principal areas for new thinking
lie and why it is that embedded notions of territory are generating some specific
problems for Just War theorists’ efforts to engage with humanitarian intervention
and the ‘war on terror’.
Space, scale, the state and ethics
That the state has been at the centre of Just War thinking for the last two hundred
years at least is surely uncontroversial and current leading Just War theorists are
embedding this centrality. What is striking is that the move is a self-consciously
ethical one – the state, so long the subject of ethical suspicion and critique – is central
to ethical responses to humanitarian abuse and terrorist violence. More specifically,
the state is both the vehicle and the source of authority for the just war against these
ills and the basis for a lasting solution to them, especially when humanitarian crises
and terrorism meld together.
Most striking is how Elshtain uses Just War arguments connecting military
intervention to the creation, or recreation, of ‘ordinary civic peace’ as the sine qua non
for ethical life.61 This civic peace not only requires effective state institutions, but
demands these take certain forms, are limited in power, are held accountable in
certain ways and are animated by a particular ethos of service to those over whom
they exercise limited authority. Elshtain sees just wars against those presiding over,
whether through intention or neglect, humanitarian catastrophes or terrorist activity
as being about bringing the victims of such abuse within the embrace of a liberal
democratic state.
Utilising the contingency of sovereignty that humanitarian intervention placed
on the agenda, Elshtain, in common with Te´son, extends this contingency to
legitimise measures against transnational terrorist organisations, principally
al Qaeda and similar groups.62 The threat they represent to the creation of civic peace
in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and their potential to disrupt the civic peace
of the US and other established Western democracies, generates just cause, and also
compromises, if not removes, the sovereignty of those states harbouring or aiding
them.
The nature of the state’s authority becomes an object of debate about just cause
and right intention as well as legitimate authority within the jus ad bellum side of the
Just War tradition. The authority of states maintaining ordinary civic peace is
superior to those that do not and to any non-state based political form. The
legitimate state is one that protects and promotes the rights and interests of its
citizens, starting with their entitlement to live securely within a territorially bounded
zone of ordinary civic peace. Where states fail or are unwilling to deliver this, or are
involved with organisations committed to the destruction of civic peace, then, as with
murderous regimes overseeing humanitarian catastrophe, they lose any serious claim
61 Elshtain, ‘International Justice’; Elshtain, Just War Against Terror; Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Against
the New Utopianism’, Ethics & International Affairs, 19:2 (2005).
62 Elshtain, ‘International Justice’; Elshtain, Just War Against Terror; Te´son, ‘Ending Tyranny’.
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to legitimacy. They lack legitimate authority and their intention in resisting Western
power is ethically reprehensible because it denies humans their right to live within a
zone of ordinary civic peace. For Te´son, this grounds the ethical superiority of the
intentions and authority of liberal democratic states: ‘the fact that the West has
disproportionate influence on the [United Nations] Security Council is one of its good
features. . . . It is unacceptable that the decision whether to free people from tyranny,
or to veto any such decision, be left to illegitimate regimes.’63
This ordinary civic peace is necessarily territorialised within the sovereign state.
Elshtain is clear about this: ‘Justice demands accountability and there is no political
accountability where there is no structure of power and law. . . . Absent such a
structure, culminating in some form of political sovereignty [and] the likelihood of
what we now routinely call ‘‘humanitarian catastrophes’’ is magnified manyfold.’64
Her argument throughout Just War Against Terror reiterates this – belief in irreduc-
ible and inalienable notions of human dignity means we have to create and preserve
zones of ordinary civic peace. In the absence of plausible or desirable global
arrangements for securing this goal, the sovereign state is the best available means.
The state also enables us to connect ordinary civic peace to shared community values,
traditions and history, reinforcing the security of civic peace. However, it follows that
ideas about community that can not or will not be bordered in this way are rendered
ethically inferior.
Relations between states cannot be separated from this ethical imperative.
International relations does not operate under different rules and according to a
different ethical logic. Coexistence among states that secure the ordinary civic peace
is unproblematic. But in relations with states and non-state organisations that either
cannot fulfil this ethical imperative or reject it in favour of religious or ideological
zealotry, coercion is justified and necessary. Retreat from the world by ‘good’ states
is self-defeating, because it allows their enemies the opportunity to prepare attacks,
and abrogates their obligation to liberate those blighted by terrorism and tyranny.
Accepting the responsibility brought by authority means engaging boldly with the
world and those who suffer the effects of illegitimate states. In a typically bravura
finale, Elshtain concludes that through her approach, ‘The brutal Melian rule is
hereby reversed: The strong do what they must in order that the weak not suffer what
they too often will.’65
Privileging the state as the solution to human rights abuses is, patently, problem-
atic. It is too easy, though, to see this as a statist hangover from the time when Just
War principally, if not solely, addressed inter-state conflict. It is true, though, that the
Just War principles with which we are so familiar are most easily applicable in that
context or, with some adjustment, to civil wars where control of the state is the object
of all parties. As this article has already argued, though, that statist perspective on the
space and scale of violence and security is widely challenged. Equally, notions of
international justice beyond the issue of violence, most obviously distributive justice,
routinely extend beyond the state to the global level.66 These wider realms of justice
are recognised, indeed Elshtain’s notion of equal regard demands such recognition
63 Te´son, ‘Ending Tyranny’, p. 17.
64 Elshtain, ‘International Justice’, p. 63.
65 Ibid., p. 75.
66 For example, Charles R. Beitz, International Relations and Political Theory (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1979).
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worked out in terms of concentric circles of obligation.67 However, when it comes to
political authority able to grant justice, and the relationship between individuals and
authority, we are thrown, inextricably it seems, into the clutches of the state and
classic liberal notions of citizenship.
This, in part, recognises that the US government in particular has recast
transnational terrorist threats within a statist discourse.68 Labelling states members
of an ‘axis of evil’, ascribing responsibility for combating terrorism to governments –
it was governments who were to decide whether they were either ‘with us [the United
States], or with the terrorists’69 – and seeing interdicting terrorist ambitions to
acquire WMD as best achieved by preventing states acquiring such technologies is
telling of a stubbornly ‘Westphalian’ world view. But more to the point here is that
academic debate about Just War, humanitarian intervention and terrorism, especially
when the latter two are connected, quickly does the same thing. The targets of a Just
War, though, may not share this geographical perspective. Here the political
geographers are clearly right – there is an effort to corral debate within a specific
territorial perspective and that this both serves the interests of the US as the leading
power – it enables the application of hard military power to the problem of
transnational terrorism – but it also must be subject to critical assessment.70 This not
only has to look at whether the solutions to the problems that arise from this
perspective are effective in addressing transnational terrorism. It must also look at the
normative implications for the rules by which we constitute and govern such activity,
and how this fits in with or disrupts the ethical schema that grants coherence and
direction to those operational norms. That should not be done in a one-eyed fashion,
whereby political programmes and concepts of authority, responsibility and justice
that are incompatible with a specific territorial perspective are automatically
marginalised.
The distinctiveness of the political programme that motivates a network, and the
very idea of networked organisational forms, points to different conceptions of
political space and scale. Whether seeking to use Just War theory to ground a limited
right to humanitarian intervention, with, notably, long-term obligations to rebuild a
functioning and hopefully liberal state;71 or to justify pursuit by the world’s leading
power of military action against terrorists and states that abet them, the issue of scale
arises.72
Just War and meeting the challenge of territory and space
It is therefore apparent that Just War theory faces a challenge from humanitarian
intervention and the ‘war on terror’ that is not just about the ability of familiar
principles and categories to deal with ‘new’ types of violence. The political and ethical
scale and geographical perspective of Just War theory demands attention, too. This
67 Elshtain, ‘International Justice’, p. 74.
68 Williams with Roach, ‘International Security’, p. 2.
69 George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, 20 September
2001, available at: 〈http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html〉.
70 For example, Flint, ‘Dynamic Metageographies’, pp. 210–12.
71 Wheeler, Saving Strangers; ICISS, Responsibility to Protect.
72 Elshtain, Just War Against Terror.
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section of the article aims to sketch out some elements of what this may involve, and
to reiterate how it is that implicit, but powerful, assumptions about space, scale and
territory can cause Just War theorists to underplay aspects of the contemporary
challenges of political violence.
The state-centrism of the Just War tradition over the last two hundred years
continues to cast a long shadow over debates about the uses of violence that appeal
to the universal – humanitarianism – and the transnational – religious fundamental-
ist terrorism. The bordered, territorial political community claiming sovereignty
offers a reassuring hearth around which we can regroup and reconsider how
to respond ethically to these challenges. The problem, particularly in relation to
transnational political projects and programmes, is that this response struggles to
engage effectively with such challenges, inviting the rejection of Just War as being a
tool of the powerful seeking to protect a geographical perspective that stems from
and favours their power. A military response to terrorism, however, may be ethically
correct, but the worry here is that the dice are loaded in favour of a military response
on the grounds that the political programmes and projects of transnational scale do
not receive the serious ethical consideration they deserve.
This is not to defend the violent, and especially terroristic, pursuit of such
programmes. It is, though, to reiterate that by increasingly embedding the ideal-type
of the liberal state at the heart of the jus ad bellum principles of legitimate authority,
just cause and right intent in particular, the contemporary debate about Just War
denies the ethical power that such projects can claim, and grants to states an ethical
standing that the record of even the most liberal might struggle to live up to. This
article has no trouble with the idea that some forms of state are ethically superior to
others and that ethical relativism is inadequate, so is not arguing for such a
standpoint. But the value that exists in non-state based forms of political identity and
community; in ethical codes that do not take their frame of reference from a specific,
territorialised perspective; and from notions of security, authority and obligation that
exist at scales different from the state and the global is potentially denied by these
contemporary developments in Just War thinking.
At its crudest, but this might serve as a simple illustration, we can see this in the
distinction drawn within Islam, and particularly important to those who seek Islamic
justification for jihad as holy war against non-believers, between the dar al Islam and
dar al harb. The realm of Islam – of truth, justice and peace – and the realm of war
which the true believer is duty bound to conquer, destroying those who do not
convert, may be a deeply problematic reading of Islamic teaching, but it also
highlights a radically different notion of political, and ethical, scale. The sense of
injustice against Muslims being felt throughout the umma – the community of
believers – is a powerful rhetorical tool, but also a notion of ethical scale that does
not have a parallel in Western liberalism. The geographical dispersal of injustices
across different places, or the seemingly distinctive political causes or manifestations
of injustice that, to a liberal perspective, generate incoherence, may have common-
ality from the perspective of a different scale.
For liberals, one moves from the community of citizenship to the community of
humanity and the idea of universal rights. Regional citizenships, institutionalised in
the European Union, of course, do not (yet?) have ethical resonance, it seems. This
article lacks the space, and its author the expertise, to develop these themes in further
depth, but it does highlight one way in which our notions of ethical scale may not
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track across to other ethical traditions. This does not have to result in a communi-
tarian account, ruling out most, but not necessarily all, of the claims to ethical
universality,73 but it does help us recognise that there are different ethical scales, and
thus a need for different political scales, too, from those that are the commonplaces
of the Western ethical and political imagination. Political programmes that appeal to
these different and distinctive ethical spaces and scales may not be incoherent, as they
frequently appear, and they should not be dismissed without due consideration. That,
of course, is not to deny the possibility of incoherence or ethical indefensibility.
However, hard-wiring a notion of ordinary civic peace, for example, into a statist
territorial political programme connected to sovereignty and an ethical scale that
privileges the state, cannot be done without serious discussion of alternatives.
Equally, our notion of Just War has to recognise the challenges here, too.
This perspective contrasts strongly with the ideas of authority and accountability
that characterise the literature surveyed here. There is little room for weighing the
ethical significance of, in this case, a territorially indistinct community such as the
umma. Instead, a just war is required that emphasises the combination of might and
right to be found in the liberal states of the world, and especially the United States,
which possesses not only a position of military dominance but also a historical,
cultural and political legacy of unique virtue. US exceptionalism is not just a trait in
US political culture, it is a reflection of the ethical superiority of the United States.74
This is not an ethical vision of a liberal global civil society, or a transnational network
of humanitarian and human rights NGOs, but instead a coalition of willing liberal
states, under the leadership of the USA, utilising international organisations where
possible, by-passing them when necessary, in pursuit of a world where new allies are
created via the implantation of just political arrangements and the defeat of ethically
bankrupt challengers. It is not surprising that the label ‘imperialism’ has returned to
prominence or that invocations of Just War can attract the kind of moral scepticism,
if not cynicism, of the critique developed in political geography’s engagements to
date.
Addressing a lack of geographical imagination in its response to these key
contemporary debates about the ethics of violence in international relations has
implications for all three of the divisions of the just war tradition – jus ad bellum, jus
in bello and jus post bellum. This article lacks the space to explore these in full, but
hopefully certain instances may illustrate the potentially significant questions that
arise and will flesh out to some extent how this criticism of Just War can lead to a
positive engagement with the tradition that will ward off the moral sceptics by setting
in train thinking that continues to build on the sophistication and insight that the first
section of the article emphasised.
For the jus ad bellum the state as the site of legitimate authority and therefore the
key declarer and prosecutor of war has been challenged, especially in discussions of
humanitarian intervention, by the idea of the UN Security Council as a superior (in
both legal and ethical senses of the word) authority. This, however, retains the statist
73 For example, Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Michael Walzer,
Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (London: University of Notre Dame Press,
1994).
74 On exceptionalism in political culture, see for example Buzan, The United States, pp. 154–64; on US
superiority see Elshtain, ‘International Justice’, pp. 64, 73; Elshtain, Just War Against Terror,
pp. 168–73; Te´son, ‘Ending Tyranny’, pp. 19–20.
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basis of the legitimate authority principle and also limits the perspective of just cause
to those instances where the Security Council can agree to utilise the elasticity in the
UN Charter’s idea of threats to international peace and security. Recognising the
moral authority of non-state actors in this regard and the justice of causes which are
inherently ill-suited to a statist framing or mediation becomes very difficult and Just
War becomes allied to a conservative interpretation of international relations. The
heavy indebtedness to international law as the pre-eminent institutionalisation of Just
War is also reinforced by such moves. The alternative scales and differently
territorialised conceptions of space in these programmes are ill-served by the
established Just War discourse, and the developments in the theory over the last
decade have done little to address this effectively.
This is despite the inherent notions of space and scale within jus ad bellum
principles, such as proportionality, which asks us to consider the balance between the
harm of the originating act of violence against the harm of the putative violent
response. The geographical extent of that violence is part of this – a global ‘war on
terror’, for instance, suggests a violent response could occur anywhere. However, the
reality has been the corralling of an ostensibly ‘global’ scale within a state-based
framework.75 Equally, the spaces of violence have also remained largely conventional
in terms of the ethical debate – the ‘battlespace’ has remained, conceptually, the
‘battlefield’ – a discrete and specific geographical location where those who are
permissibly subject to violence congregate. Securing spaces where either political
authority is complicit with terrorist networks or where authority is so weak as to
be unable to prevent their operations is a commonplace in political debates about
the war on terror.76 A distinction is still drawn, though, between this and a
‘battlefield’ – the ethical location of legitimate large-scale violence.
Talk of the ‘battlefield’ raises the issue of the implications of this argument for the
jus in bello. Here the categories of combatant and non-combatant have been
challenged anew. Some have risked advocating a reopening of the debate within Just
War whereby the innocence of non-combatants is connected to their not presenting
a real or imminent threat of violence, as opposed to being innocent of any political
commitment to support an unjust political project.77 When that political project lies
outside of the established, state-focused frameworks Just War is used to dealing with,
then the problem is exacerbated. Can one be a ‘combatant’ in the name of a
transnational political project that cannot be accommodated within the dominant
contemporary geographical framework, and can one claim the authority of acting in
the name of the leaders of such a project? Whilst this helps to highlight the
long-standing problem in relation to terrorists as either combatants or non-
combatants, and leaving aside the US government’s designation of ‘illegal combat-
ants’ in order to open some room for manoeuvre on this issue, the question of
proportionality is at stake here, as well. Whilst the combatant/non-combatant
distinction has grabbed most of the attention in the ‘war on terror’, and also in
humanitarian intervention debates where the status of irregular paramilitary forces
has been important, the issue of proportionality is also potentially controversial.
75 Here the political geographers get it right. See Flint and Fallah, ‘How the United States Justified Its
War on Terrorism’.
76 For example, Williams with Roach, ‘International Security’.
77 For example, Barry Buzan, ‘Who May We Bomb?’ in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds), Worlds in
Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
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The global ‘war on terror’, for example, places at the centre of the challenge the
idea of transnational terrorist networks, loosely affiliated to one another and based
on local cells, operating across borders and with little connection to established,
territorialised political authority. However, do our ethical concerns about the
proportionality of violence reflect this, or, if not, how does this contribute to the
debate about military operations? When judging the proportionality of violence, do
we judge against the damage inflicted against ‘global terrorism’, if such a label has
utility, or do we judge it against the local cell and the environment in which they are
operating? Given the looseness of the affiliations and the absence of centralised
command and control characteristic of networked terrorism where, for example, al
Qaeda is likened to a brand rather than any sort of centralised structure, can attacks
in one place be justified in terms of proportionality by reference to damaging
affiliated elements of the network elsewhere?
Finally, the jus post bellum standard that emerges from the literature on
humanitarian intervention and the war on terror seems focused on creating func-
tioning states. Ideally these are liberal and democratic in character, able to establish,
protect and embed social, political and economic structures that will secure the new
state in the short-term and, looking further ahead, bring about the kind of civic peace
Elshtain advocates. This foundation will also help create economic prosperity to
address the social exclusion and disillusionment that are often portrayed as deep-
rooted explanations for the attractions of violence.78 Irrespective of the empirical
accuracy of these claims, this is, by any standards, a Herculean political task. It also
represents an ethical prescription out of kilter with the Just War tradition’s far more
limited practice of addressing the immediate causes of war. Of course, the advocates
of a more ethically ambitious and transformative Just War are able to appeal to
classical authority for their ideas – the idea of a Just War being one that will ensure
there is no need to repeat the exercise, and thus the need to get to the root causes.
However, the record in Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq so far gives
serious pause for thought about the viability of such an approach, practically and
ethically.
More extensively, this article has raised questions about the viability of a statist
strategy for addressing the challenge of jus post bellum. As we have seen, ethics,
identity and security are being addressed at different scales and in different spaces,
and these, too, need to be part of the mix of debate about an ethical response to
post-conflict societies and how to effectively address terrorism. Just War thinking has
yet to pick up on this in a systematic fashion and explore in depth and with sustained
attention the opportunity for different spaces and scales to play a positive role in how
we think and act ethically in response to the aftermath of armed conflict. In the
search for answers to how and when to act, the need to remember the idea of a
tradition of enquiry, identifying which questions to ask and how to ask them, is in
danger of being lost as we search for rules to apply, clear principles to uphold and
laws that justify specific responses. Drawing on the richness of the tradition of Just
War thinking to ask questions, think reflectively and critically and to seize new
challenges, such as the impacts of these alternative political spaces, scales and
78 For a critical assessment of this link see, for example, Alan B. Kreuger and Jitka Malecˇkova´,
‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?’ Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 17:4 (2003).
Space, scale and Just War 599
territorialisations is just as important an aspect and the questions this section of the
article has tried to ask may hopefully go a small way towards reinforcing this
imperative.
Conclusion
The longevity, flexibility and sophistication of the Just War tradition is imposing and
its centrality to contemporary debates about humanitarian intervention and the ‘war
on terror’ unsurprising as a result. However, the question of the political spaces that
the principal contemporary liberal manifestation of the Just War tradition envisages
as the location of ethical debate and behaviour, and the political scale at which it
operates, are potentially problematic. Humanitarian crises and transnational terror-
ism pose important questions in both these regards and, so far, Just War thinking
has responded principally by reasserting the centrality and value of established,
traditional frameworks. The state retains its central position in all three arenas of
contemporary Just War thinking and this is hampering its ability to respond, not in
terms of ethical critique of human rights abuses and terrorist attacks – these are goals
into which Just War theorists have found it easy to hit balls – but in terms of
accommodating, even recognising, the potential ethical import of non-state based
frames of political reference, claims to political authority and scales of political
activity. A more dynamic approach to these topics in other parts of international
relations is not being followed through in Just War theory to the necessary extent.
A comprehensive analysis of what this might mean in terms of exploiting Just
War’s famed flexibility to meet this challenge better is a long-term project a single
article cannot hope to attempt. However, I have tried to sketch some sort of agenda,
or at least a set of provisional starting points in jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post
bellum terms. If nothing else these have hopefully served to highlight that this is a
significant challenge and that if we are to use Just War theory, as we should, in
debating, exploring and framing ethical thought about some of the most important
political challenges we face today, there needs to be movement in this direction.
Territory, borders and ethics have received fairly limited consideration in the past,
especially in international relations, but that position, it is argued here, is under
challenge.79 Just War theory has made some adjustments to address the changing
ethics of violence of the last fifteen years, but now it needs to recognise the
significance of the diversification that our political spaces and scales are undergoing.
Our political ethics, including the ethics of war, are under renewed pressure and in
need of renewed innovation. The next chapter in the long history of Just War theory
must include sustained consideration of ethics, space and scale.80
79 This is discussed at length in Williams, Ethics and Territorial Borders.
80 I would like to thank the Review’s anonymous referees for their comments on the first submission
of this article and also those colleagues who have commented on earlier drafts along the way.
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